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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ELISEO J. ~I ... ~RES, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
~1 ... -\SON \"V. HILL, Warden of the 
Utah State Penitentiary, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
735·3 
It was stipulated at the hearing before the Special 
Referee, by the parties hereto, that the original files, 
records, or·ders, transcripts .and proceedings of the Pre-. 
liminary Hearing before the Honorable William H. 
Chappell, Justice's Court, Coalville Precinct, and all 
proceedings in the District C.ourt in Case No. 420 en-
titled State of Utah vs. Eliseo J. Mares, Jr., and all 
records, orders, petitions and briefs filed in the Su-
preme Court in the same ·case No. 7092 · criminal, be the 
factual evidence in the ~ase, plus any other stipulation 
proposed and agreed to by the parties hereto. (Trans-
cript of hearing before Referee p. 30-34 incl., 36 and 37.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
From the foregoing records, proceedings, files and 
stipulations, the following statement of facts is apropos: 
(Records, etc. referred to in this brief are denorn-
inated in the following manner: Transcript of Prelimi-
nary Hearing (PT); ·Transcript of District Court case 
(R); Amended Findings of the Special Referee (AF). 
1. The plaintiff, Eliseo J. Mares, Jr., was born 
November 26, 1927, at Crowley, Colorado. In his early 
youth the family moved to Antonito, Colorado, where 
his father was a deputy sheriff for many years. On 
November 29, 1945, at the age of eighteen years, plain-
tiff was inducted into the United States Army. On or 
about April 29, 1946, while stationed at Gieger Field, 
Spokane, Washington, plaintiff absented himself with-
out leave from the army and returned to his home at 
Antonito, Colorado, to see his wife and newly born baby. 
On his return to Antonito his father advised him to 
return immediately to his station at· Gieger Field in 
Washington. On his way back to his .army station, 
plaintiff took a 1937 Packard sedan automobile with a 
New York license plate from a parking lot near the bus 
depot at Denver, Colorado, and started north on High-
way No. 85 toward Wyoming. He drove west on U. S. 
Highway No. 30 toward Utah. During this trill' he 
picked up two soldiers who were hitchhiking near Lara-
mie; Wyoming. He found a 32 caliber automatic pistol 
in the glove compartment of the Packard sedan. He 
put the pistol in his suit case, noting at the time that 
the clip contained six steel-jacketed bullets. He con-
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tinued 'vest on U .. s. Highway No. 30 until he reached a 
place about seven n1iles east of Sinclair, Wyoming. At 
this point the Packard sedan developed' motor trouble 
and broke the connecting rod. The soldiers who had been 
riding with him left in another car and the Packard was 
later towed into Sinclair by John C. Bennett, a garage 
man in that town. Plaintiff was told by the garage 
mechanic that the Packard could not be repaired and 
that it would be necessary to install a new motor. About 
a half hour after he arrived at the garage, on Sunday, 
June 23, 1946, plaintiff noticed a 1937 gray Ford tu-
dor sedan being towed into the garage. The driver was 
Jack Derwood Stallings, the person whose death is the. 
basis of the murder charge filed against plaintiff. The 
plaintiff became acquainted with Stallings. They ate 
dinner together and Stallings told plaintiff that he 
would give him a ride to Ogden, Utah, if he would help 
him repair his Ford. 'They both slept in their cars in the 
garage. That night there were ten or twelve other cars 
stored in the garage with the keys left in the ignition 
lock so the cars could be moved at anytime. The cars 
belonged to patrons of the hotel. No one else stayed in 
the garage except plaintiff and Stallings throughout 
the night. There was a rear door to the garage with a 
latch on the inside which could be opened by anyone 
on the inside of the garage. On Monday morni~g plain-
tiff loaned Stallings $15.00 to buy parts for his Ford. 
At that time Stallings told plaintiff that he would have 
some money sent to him to Ogden and would pay him 
back. They worked on the car until noon Monday. They 
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then went over to the hotel where the plaintiff pur-
chased a quart of whiskey from the liquor store located 
in the hotel. They both had a good drink of liquor be-
fore eating and had another after they finished their 
luncheon. They then went back to the garage, got in 
Stallings' car and started west on Highway No. 30. 
They had only gone a few miles when car trouble de-
veloped and they were towe·d into Rawlins, Wyoming. 
They _stayed in Rawlins approximately two hours re-
pairing the Ford. They purchased a fuel pump from 
Pat Chaffin who operated the Ford garage at Rawlins. 
They drank some more of the whiskey between :Sinclair 
and Rawlins. Mr. Chaffin testified that plaintiff had a 
smell of fresh whiskey on his breath at the time he sold 
him the fuel pump; that he did not get close enough to 
Mr. Stallings. to ascertain· if he had been drinking. 
Plaintiff went with Jack Stallings to the telegraph of-
fice where Jack sent a telegram to a girl friend in San 
Jose,- California, requesting that she send him thirty 
dollars in care of Western Union at Ogden, Utah. They 
left Rawlins at app~roximately 5:00 o'clock P.M. Be-
tween Rawlins. and Little America they had considerable 
trouble with the Ford car on account of vapor-lock. At 
Little _America they bought a hand pump in order to 
pump out the fuel line. They also bought another bottle 
of whiskey. They had finished drinking the quart which 
they purchased at Sinclair before they arrived at Little 
America. They also ate dinner at Little America. Be-
tween Little America and Evanston they each fired 
two shots from the· 32. pistol which plaintiff obtained 
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from the glove c.ompartment of the Packard auton1obile, 
leaving two shells in the eli'p. They continued to have 
trouble with the Ford car between Little America and 
Evanston. It \vas necessary to blow out the fuel line 
a nmnber of times before they reached Evanston. The 
bottle of whiskey which they purchased at Little Ameri-
ca was nearly consumed between that point and Evans-
ton and there was only a small amount left in the bottle 
when they left Evanston. They had trouble with the 
Ford when they arrived at Evanston and while Stallings 
'vas attempting to repair the same the p~laintiff walked 
down the street to see if he could steal a car. He saw 
a man park a car and leave the ignition key in the lock. 
He then went back and reported to Stallings that they 
could steal that car. Stallings had fixed his own car by 
that time. Stallings put his identification bracelet and 
ring in the glove compartment of the car while he went 
in to wash his hands and plaintiff stayed in the car with 
the motor idling. They left Evanston after midnight 
Monday and continued their trip toward Ogden. At that 
time plaintiff had had too much to drink and was sleepy 
and he went to sleep. Stallings drove the car when they 
left Evanston. (R. 503-541) 
2. From this point in the case the evidence as sub-
mitted by the State differs from that offered by the 
plaintiff in support of his defense. The State relied 
principally upon the testimony of P. H. Neeley, the 
Cownty Atto~rney of Summit County. Stallings drove 
the car from Evanston down to the Utah State line. 
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When he arrived at that point he awakened plaintiff and 
told him they were entering Utah. He -continued to 
drive the car down Echo Canyon to a point approxi-
mately one and a quarter miles west of E-cho. Neeley 
testified : ''I asked Mr. Mares when he conceived doing 
this. He said he had been thinking about it on the trip. 
He said when Mr. Stallings drove the ear over the Utah-
Wyoming line that Mr. Stallings woke Mr. Mares up. 
Mr. Mares at that time he said, Mr. Mares said, at that 
time he was -sleeping in the back seat of the car, and he 
said Stallings said : 'We are entering Utah.' Mares 
then opened his suitcase, changed his shirt, took the gun 
and laid it on the side of the back seat, and said that he 
made up his !flind to kill Stallings and take that car 
coming down Echo Canyon." (R. 338) Neeley further 
testified that Mares told him when they got down to a 
point approximately one and a quarter miles past the 
town of Echo, Stallings pulled off the side of the road 
for the purpose of resting and when Stallings got out 
of the ,car on the right-hand side of the car and was look-
ing down at the tire or his shoe laces, and without any 
quarreling of any kind or any p·remonition of what.was 
going to happen, the plaintiff took the pistol which he 
obtained from the glove compartment of the Packard 
automobile, reached his arm tl;lrough the back window 
and while Stallings was in a stooped position and with-
out any warning whatsoever, fired ~a shot into Stallings' 
head; that Stallings fell to the ground; t})at plaintiff got 
out of the car, picked up the lifeless body, put it in the 
seat of the car and put Stallings' jacket over the head; 
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that plaintiff then backed the car out and turned it 
around and drove back up Echo Canyon to the junction 
of High"~ay No. 30 with the road that leads south to 
Coalville; that he went through the underpass, drove 
the car down through Coalville, and when he got to the 
little town of Hoytsville at what is known as Judd Hill 
the car stopped; that there were cars passing hy and 
he was afraid someone would discover the dead body 
of Stallings in the car, so he took the body out and ·put 
it in the canal; that the plaintiff then p:roceeded down 
Parley's Canyon into Salt Lake County; from there ·he 
went to Immigration Canyon where he threw away the 
gun, Stallings' clothes and Stallings' identification 
bracelet and ring which he found in the glove comp,art-
ment; that he continued to Ogden where he sold the car 
to Iver J. Wistisen for $425.00 and a bicycle which was 
in the trunk for $6.00; that plaintiff and Wistisen went 
to the Desk Sergeant of the O·gden Police Department, 
who notarized the plaintiff's forged signature of Jack 
Stallings on the title paper~ to the automobile. He also 
went to the Western Union Telegraph Station· and re-
ceived $30.00 which Stallings' girl friend had s~nt to 
him in answer to his telegraphic request sent from Raw-
lins; that plaintiff represented to the officials of the 
Western Union that he was Jack Derwood Stallings in 
obtaining the $30.00; that plaintiff then left Ogden and 
returned about a month later when he was recognized on 
the streets by Wistisen, who reported to the Ogden 
police and the plaintiff was arrested. The State called 
~lRS. G·LADYS RICHINS JONES as its witness. ·M.rs. 
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Jones lives on the Echo Canyon Road about two city 
blocks east of the point of the alle_ged killing of Stallings. 
She testified that in the latter part of June, to-wit, around 
the 23rd or 24th of the month, she was awakened in th~ 
early hours of the morning by a car travelling west on 
the road in front of their home; that she heard a man 
crying for help as the car proceeded down to the point 
of the alleged slaying. When the car stopped she heard 
a voice say, "don't, don't, don't do it"; then she heard 
a shot and after a pe·riod of quiet the car hacked up and 
turned around and went back up the road past her home; 
she got to the window just after the shot was fired; 
she saw the car turn back onto the road and travel back 
east past her home toward the town of Echo. This 
witness was subpoenred by the State at the preliminary 
hearing but was excused and the plaintiff called her as 
his witness. At the trial Mrs. Jones. was subpoenaed 
as the plaintiff'·s witness but the State called her as its· 
own witness. Mrs. Jones reported this occurrence to 
the police officials long before plaintiff was arrested 
and before the plaintiff disclosed any information as to 
his movements both before and after the death of 
Stallings. (R. 399-408; 436-451) 
3. The defense relied princip·ally upon the testi-
mony of plaintiff, Eliseo J. Mares, Jr. The plaintiff 
te-stified· that· upon leaving Evanston he was riding in 
the. front seat of the Ford automobile beside Stallings, 
who· was driving the car; that he had had too much to 
drink and·fell asleep. The next tlling he remembered on 
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the trip "~as 'vhen Stallings \Yoke him up at a roadhouse 
or tavern in Echo Canyon just before they got to the 
lTtah State line. They stopped their car a little west 
of the tavern as there were five or six cars parked in 
front of the tavern. ·They went in to buy some beer to 
take out. The bartender refused to sell th~m any beer 
and told the1n that they ·had had too much to drink 
already. Stallings then went outside and the plaintiff 
stayed on the inside for some time arguing with the 
bartender. Plaintiff then left the tavern and when he 
got outside discovered Stallings was havin_g a .fight ~th 
some fellows on the outside. Stallings was on the 
ground and a ''big guy dressed like a cowboy with levi's 
and boots'' was kicking him. The plaintiff tried to stop 
the fight and one of the fellows threw him out of the. 
fracas. The plaintiff went to the car, picked up a tire. 
iron, came back to the scene of the fight and struck thei 
fellow over the head with the tire iron, the one who was 
kicking Stallings. The fellow fell down and plaintiff 
thought he had killed him. Plaintiff was about .to hit 
another of Stallings' attackers when he was hit over 
the head and knocked unconscious. The next thing he 
remembered he was ·going down Echo Canyon riding in 
the front seat beside Jack. He testified that Stallings 
was bleeding on the left side of his face and his left eye 
was either out or partly· out of the socket. Stallings 
had a wild look in his eye and was driving the car very 
rapidly down the canyon; that Stallings' ap·pearance and 
actions indicated that he was out of his head due to the 
beating he had just received. Plaintiff tried to get hilu 
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to stop the car hut he got no response and Stallings 
kept driving the car faster and faster down the canyon. 
The plaintiff started hollering for help as the car ca-
reened down the canyon road. Plaintiff then kicked 
Stallings' foot off the accelerator in an effort to slow 
down the speed of the car. In keeping Stallings' foot 
off the accelerator he finally slowed the car down and 
when it came to a turn he grabbed the steering wheel 
and turned it off the road where it came to a stop 
against a bank about a mile and a quarter west of the 
town of Echo. He testified that Stallings had a wild 
look . on his face; Mares jumped into the back seat. 
~Stallings the:n slid out from under the wheel and started 
toward plaintiff with a tire iron in his hand muttering 
that he would kill him. Stallings tried to get into the 
back seat to hit him with the tire iron and plaintiff 
pushed his hands off the ·seat twice and .when he could 
no longer resist him, plaintiff took the gun off the seat 
and fired once through the right rear window. Plaintiff 
said he did not think he hit Stallings with the bullet. 
Stallings crump~led on the ground in an unconscious 
condition. Plaintiff picked him up and put a Navy 
blouse or a jacket around his neck and set him in the 
front seat. He intended to take him to a hospital in 
Salt L·ake City, so he turned the car around ·and drove 
back to the junction, or underpass, to go down the Coal-
ville road as he had noticed the sign Salt Lake City 
when they passed the . junction. When they got to the 
little town of Hoytsville, the car stopped. near a canal 
bridge. He felt Stallings' heart and came to the con-
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elusion that Stallings \vas dead. He then put the body 
in the canal ditch \Yhere there was no water. He took 
Stallings' \Vallet fron1 his person, which containe-d his 
discharge papers and title to the car. He then drove 
the car down Parley's Canyon and disposed of the car 
and other property of Stallings as hereinabove set forth. 
(R. 503-541) 
±. The alleged killing occurred on June 24, 19'46; 
Stallings' body was found on July 9, 1946, in the -canal 
about three-quarters of a mile north of where the- canal 
crosses the high,vay. It was caught in a flume. The 
body was removed by Deputy Sheriff James H. Wilde, 
the undertaker W. Harvey Dunn and others, and taken 
to the Dunn Mortuary. A cursory examination of the 
body disclosed that the left eye was out of the socket 
lying on the left check. There was a puncture wound 
above the right eye. An autopsy was performed by pr. 
E. W. ·oldham and Dr. E. G. Wright in the pre~ence .of 
W. Harvey Dunn, the undertaker, a dentist by the name 
of F. J. Reese and Deputy :Sheriff James H. Wilde. 
X-·ray ·pictures were taken of the head, spinal column 
and the upper portion of the body and a complete autop-
sy was performe-d. The body was then buried and some 
weeks later was disintered and additional autopsy 'W~s 
performed. The X-ray pictures did not disc~ose the 
presence of any bullet slug in the cranial cavity, nor 
in the spinal column or any part of Stallings' body. 
The autopsy disclosed a puncture wound directly over 
the .right eye (Dr. Oldham testified in the right temple 
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region) but no exit wound was discovered in any part of 
· the cranial skull spinal column or any other 'P;art of the 
I ' body of Stallings. No bullet slug was found in the 
cranial cavity or the spinal column or any p~art of Stal-
lings' body. The undertaker, W. Harvey Dunn, testified 
that there were no powder burns around the puncture 
wound. (R. 320, 321; 140-235) 
·5, On the 19th day of August, 1946, plaintiff was 
taken by Sheriff George M. Fisher and others over the 
route he took from the place where he threw the gun 
in I:mmigration Canyon, back through Parley's Canyon 
to Ho~tsville, where the body was placed in the canal 
and over the scene of the alleged crime. There were two 
County Attorneys in this party, namely P. H. Neeley 
of Summit County and a Mr. Connel of Morgan Coun-
ty, a Mr. Bernard Dahlquist, the Sheriff of Morgan Coun-
ty, Mr. Bagnell, a Deputy Sheriff of ~summit County 
and Mr. London of the State Liquor Commission. Mr. 
Bagnell, Mr. Mares and Sheriff Dahlquist were sitting 
in the back seat of one car and P. H. Neeley and Sheriff 
George Fisher were sitting in the front seat of said 
car. Mr. London rode in a second ~r. The conversa-
tions which P. H. Neeley testified he had with the 
plaintiff covering every element of this alleged crime 
were elicited from the plaintiff during this ride. There 
never was any court order in existence authorizing the 
taking of the ·plaintiff back over the route he had fol-
lowed during the 24th of J nne, 1946, for the purpose of 
re-enacting the crime. (AF 3) All -of the ~above named 
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u~t·nesses testified at the preliminary hearing except 
the Cou·nty Attorney P. H. Neeley. He oonducted· the 
prelintinary hearing. These witnesses, at the prelimi-
nary hearing did not testify to ·any such conversation 
betu,een P. H. Neeley and the plaintiff at the place of 
the aUeged kiUing as testified t.o by P. H. Neeley at the 
trial of this .case. They were all subpoenaed as the 
State's witnesses at the trial of this case, but the State 
did not call any of them. The plaintiff called Sheriff 
Bernard Dahlquist in an effort to impeach Neeley's 
testimony, relying upon the transcript of Dahlquist's 
testimony taken at the preliminary hearing. The plain-
tiff testified that he did not disclose to the officers the 
fight which occurred at the state line roadhouse or tavern 
as he thought he had killed the person he hit over the 
head with the tire iron and he did not want to be charged 
with murder. He denied that he told P. H. Neeley or 
anyone else that he planned to kill Stallings and s-teal 
his car coming down from Wyoming. He testified that 
he told P. H. Neeley that he planned to steal a car in 
Wyoming, referring to the car which he intended to 
steal at Evanston as. hereinabove set forth. He also 
testified that he told Mr. Neeley it was a wonder Mr. 
Stallings was not killed in Wyoming. (Plain·tiff had ref-
erence to the fight at the state line tavern, which he did 
not disclose to Mr. Neeley). Mr. Mares contended that 
Mr. Neeley garbled his statement when he testified that 
plaintiff told him that he planned to kill Stallings 1n 
Wyoming. ( R. 324-341 ; 543-57 4; AF 3) 
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6. The plain tiff, Eliseo J. Mares, Jr., was ar-
rested on the evening of August 16, 1946, at about 8 :30 
P.M. and was taken to the Ogden City Ja;il where he 
was booked by desk sergeant Howard K. Keeter. When 
Mares asked, ''What is it all about~'' Keeter told Mares, 
"We just wanted to do a little investigating, that was 
all." (PT 108) 
7. P. H. Neeley, County ·Attorney of Swnmit 
County, who prepared the case for the prosecution from 
its inception, interviewed the plaintiff on the 17th of 
August at the Ogden City Jail. In that conversation 
he told plaintiff that he had two lawyers for him, but 
no lawyers ever ·contacted plaintiff until after he was 
~ken before the com.mitting magi~trate. (R. 363) 
On the evening of August 17th Neeley brought 
people in to the Ogden jail to identify Mr. Mares as tlte 
man who sold the decedent's car to Mr. Wistisen. He 
would have Mr. Mares walkout from a little side room in 
the Police Department and see if these p·eo1Jle could 
identify· him. One of these p·ersons ·by the name ·of Bob 
Young id~ntified him rather hesitatingly at first and 
Mr. ~a~e~ ·cursed him, and Mr. Young said, ''Now I 
know you are the man that sold that car." _(R. 363-372) 
Neeley then testified as· follows: (R. 3-72-37.3) 
. ''It just seemed to put a depression on every-
body in there. I said to the boy: 'I will have.: to 
file a complaint against you, it seems to 1ne, for 
·stealing this car.' We sat there. 1 t was late. 1 
got up and I said: ''Have you anything further 
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t J>' H "d 'N ' . o say. e sa1 : o; and 'vhen we were 
ready to leave he said to me: 'Come here.' 
THE COURT: That is the defendant~ 
A. That was the defendant. He said: 
'Come here~' and he pointed to that ·door ~ver 
there 'vhere we had had him walk out of. I 
went over ther·e and he said:. ''I stole that car.' 
I said: 'Wait a minute, n1y boy. Let me get 
your parents. Let me get your father and your 
mother and .a lawyer, a friend. Haven't you 
somebody~' I said: 'Don't tell that to me, he-
cause I will use it against you;' and he said: 
'No,' he ·did not want anybody to know anything 
about it. He did not want a lawyer. He did not 
want his father or mother; and after that he at 
times said he did not want them to know a thing 
about it. 
As I remember, on the 22nd of August, 
against his will, I wrote to his father and ;told 
him the predicament his son was in." 
Up to this time the plaintiff had denied any con-
nection with the alleged crime. 
8. After this interview on the 17th of August, 
two special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, namely J. Eldon Dunn and David W. Murray, were 
sent up to Ogden to interrogate the plaintiff. These 
special agents were not legally trained investigators, but 
were used by the F.B.I. during the period of the war 
by reason of the shortage of specially trained lawyers 
regularly employed by this Federal Bureau. They were 
closeted with the plaintiff, Mr. Mares, from two o'clock 
until 7:00 o'clock on the afternoon of August 18th. (R. 
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414). The interrogation of the plaintiff occupied approx-
imately five hours' time. During said period Mr. Dunn 
took notes of what Mares told him. Notes were intro-
duced in evidence as p;art of the cross-examination of 
Mr. Dunn as Exhibit 1. 
Mr. Dunn testified as follows: (R. 41·3) 
"Q. Mr. Dunn, during the hours that you 
talked with him or the time that you talked with 
him, before dictating this Exhibit 'P', you made 
notes of the pertinent things which he stated to 
you and you jotted them down in these notes 
which now have been indentified as Exhibit 1 ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So anything that was pertinent to the 
ease-l think I am using your language, am I not, 
that is the language you used at the preliminary 
hearing isn't it~ 
A. I used it in some question, yes, sir. 
Q. You took those pertinent things down 
and wrote the notes (R. 414) yourself after you 
concluded the interview with this defendant, and 
from those notes which you took down of what 
he told you, you and Mr. Murray dictated Ex-
hibit 'P' to the stenographer, Afton Kurns, did 
you not¥ 
A. We dictated part of it, yes, sir. 
Q. Was there any part that anybody else 
dictated7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What part of Exhibit 'P' did anybody 
else dictate, except you and Mr. Murray~ 
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...:\. Specifically, I can't point to any part. 
Q. You can't 'point to any p·art ~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Who else did the dictating besides you 
and ~lr. nlurray~ 
A. Part of it was dictated by 1\{r. Mares. 
Q. But you can't point out one solitary bit 
of infor1nation on any of this Exhibit 'P' that Mr. 
~lares dictated, can you~ 
A. Not specifically, no, sir. 
Q. For instance, this first ·line here, the 
first paragraph here of Exhibit 'P' : 
'I Eliseo J. Mares, Jr., make the following 
statement to David W. Murray and .J. Eldon 
Dunn, who have identified themselves to me as 
special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation. I make this statement voluntarily, of my 
own free will, in the presence of Sheriff George 
M. Fisher of Summit County, Utah, Sheriff Ber-
nard Dahlquist, Morgan County, Utah, Captain 
Clifford K. Keeter, Ogden City Police Depart-
ment and P. H. Neeley, County Attorney of 
Summit County, Utah. No threats or promises 
have been used to induce me to make this state-
ment, and I know that it ~n be used in a court 
of law against me.' 
(R. 415) The defendant did not dictate that, did 
he~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You dictated it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. He did not even know the names of these 
people? 
A. I don't recall whether he had been in-
troduced to them or not. 
Q. But you dictated that~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The only things which you examined 
the defendant about, or the· story that he told 
you, you jotted down all the important things 
and put them in these notes, defendant's Ex-
hibit 1, didn't you 1 
A. I think so, yes, sir ... ( R. 422). 
Q. Then you prepared Exhibit 'P' by dic-
tating, either you or someone else, by calling in 
the stenographer of the Chief of Police and she 
took down the dictation 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that correct 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the dictation was dictated exactly 
as it is put in this document, was it not~ 
A. I believe so, yes, sir. 
Q .. After it was dictated, she left and went 
down and transcribed it did she not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you went out with the officers, to 
dinner, someplace, did you not~ 
A. I believe I stayed in the building. 
Q. You believe you stayed in the building~ 
A. Yes. 
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Q. ,\ ... ho gaYe you the docun1ent after she 
transrribed itT 
.... \.. She handed it to us. 
Q. '''r ere you there when she typewrote 
this upT 
.. A.. I think I was there for about five min-
utes, no longer. 
Q. It took here so1netime to typewrite it, ' 
did it not~ 
.A.. Yes, sir. (R. 423). 
Q. TheTe was never any dictation, or no 
questions "\Yere ever propounded to Mr. 1Iares 
and those questions taken down in shorthand by 
~Iiss Kurns and then the answers made by Mr. 
Mares and those answers taken down by the 
stenographer, was there~ 
A. Do you mean in question and answer 
form? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, sir .... (R. 426). 
Q. You did not advise this boy that he 
could have a lawyer, did you? 
A. No, sir.-
Q. At any time? 
A. No, sir . .. (R. 427). 
Q. (By Mr. McC·u.llovugh) I believe you 
stated yesterday, Mr. Duwn, tha,t ·at no time did 
you .advise Mr. Mares that he could ha:ve a law-
yfr or should ha.ve a lawyer. 
A. That is right, yes, sir. 
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Q. You never heard an;yone in your presence 
at amy time, during this interview from two 
o'clock wntil seven o'clock, when you returned . 
back to have this Exhib1it, the alleged confession, 
$igned, you never he.ard any of those p1eople pre-
sent advise him he could have a lawyer? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And the short statement of how the act-
ual killing took place, which is contained on page 
two of Exhibit 'P' which is known as Exhibit 
'E' in the preliminary hearing, is the entire in-
formation which you re-ceived from Mr. Mares; 
is that correct~ 
A. No sir, that is not the entire statement. 
Q. I did not ask you that. I asked you if 
that is the entire instrument. To refresh your 
memory, on page two of Exhibit 'E' now known 
as Exhibit 'P' but known in the preliminary 
hearing as Exhibit 'E': 
'After Jack stop-ped the car by the side of 
the road, (R. 428) we decided to rest there 
awhile, and I got in the back seat. I had already 
taken the pistol out of my suitcase and placed it 
on the rear seat. I did this near Evanston, Wy-
oming, when I changed shirts after we had 
stopp~d for a brief rest. After Jack stO'pped the 
car, I got out of the front seat into the back seat 
and was sitting there when Jack got out of the 
car on the right side of the front seat and stood 
by the car. He was bending over slightly by the 
side of the car with his head a little below the 
level of the car windows. I picked up the gun 
which was on the rear seat beside me and ex-
tended it through the rear side window on the 
right side of the car, close to Jack's head and 
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~hot once. Follo\\Ting the ~hot, he in1mediately 
fell to the ground "Tithout uttering a sound. I 
"Tas very frightened and wanted to run away, 
but decided not to do that.' 
T·hat is the entire inforn1ation which you re- . 
ceived fron1 the defendant as to what took place 
at the scene of the actual shooting; is that true~ 
A. I don't recall any In ore information he 
gave us on that point. 
Q. Your notes are not even that full, are 
theyT 
.A... X o sir, they are not. 
Q. The fact of the matter is your notes do 
not contain many of the statements that are in 
that paragraph~ 
A. That is right, yes, sir. 
Q. So that the statement in this p~ragraph 
is more elaborated than what you have in your 
notes T (R. 429). 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The only thing you have in your notes is 
as follows-about the only thing I can see here 
IS: 
'Let back window down, got out of front op-
posite driver's side. Got gun put when you went 
· in back seat. There fifteen minutes before he shot 
him. Turned dome lights '-is that turned down 
dome lights~ What is the rest ·J? 
A. Turned on do1ne lights. 
Q. 'Poked pistol out.' 
A. Yes, sir. 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is all that is in the notes isn't it~ 
A. I believe so, yes, sir. 
Q. May I get the answer, whether or not 
that is all the information that is now contained 
in Exhibit 'P' which I read to you and the notes 
which I have just read to you in this Exhibit '1 ', 
is all the information that you received from the 
the defendant with reference to how the actual 
killing took place ~ 
A. I believe so, yes, sir. 
Q. There isn't any question about it, is 
there! That is what you so testified at the pre-
liminary hearing isn't it~ 
A Y . " . es, sir. 
MR. DAVID W. MURRAY, :Special Agent for the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified at the pre-
liminary hearing as follows: (PT 264). 
'' Q. You say that this interview didn't last 
until about 7:00 o'-clock in the evening~ 
A. I couldn't say exactly, sir. 
Q. Then, after the interview took place you 
called in a stenographer, didn't you~ ( PT 265) 
A. Captain Keeter secured a stenographer 
for us. 
Q. You dictated a statement, you and ~{r. 
Dunn dictated a statement to this stenographer, 
of what was purported to have been told you by 
Mr. Mares? 
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£\. That is right, sir. 
Q. ''Tho dictated that Btateinent ~ 
~\. It "yas done jointly, with the assistance 
of the defendant. 
Q. ,, ... hy didn't you ask l\lr. Mares ques-
tions, and then have those questions taken down 
in shorthand, then the answers which Mr. Mares 
gave to the questions; why didn't you follow 
that procedure~ 
A. Well, our custom ordinarily is to inter-
·vie'v the person that we are interested in, making 
notes on the conversation or interview that takes 
place, and then if a signed statement is necessary, 
reduce the contents of that interview to writing. 
Q. You think that is the way that the F.B.I. 
officials usually do the job ~ 
A. That is the way I do it~ 
Q. That is the way you do it~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·That is the way you did it in this case~ 
A. That is right, sir. 
Q. The statements that you took from Mr. 
Mares are contained in this Exhibit 'E' which 
is p·urporting to be a statement given on August 
18, 1946, and is signed by the defendant, and 
also you as a witness. ( PT 266). That is your 
name, David W. Murray~ 
A. That is correct, sir. 
Q. Does that statement contain the state-
ments of the interview that "\Vas given between 
the hours of 2 :30 and 7 :00 o'clock, whatever 
time it wasY 
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A. That is the story that Mr. Mares told 
to us. 
Q. And you took this statement fron1 the 
notes that you took of his conversation~ 
A. And with his assistance at the time. 
Q. Where is there any assistance; where is 
there anything he dictated~ Can you point out 
anything he dictated in this statement~ 
A. Not spe·cifically that he dictated, no, sir. 
Q. The language in that statement was 
either yours or Mr. Dunn's, wasn't it~ 
A. No, not necessarily so. 
Q. Where is there any language Mr. Mares 
used! 
A. For instance, he says : 'I was born No-
vember 26, 1927, at Crowley, Colorado.' 
Q. Did he say that~ 
A. Yes, he told us that. 
Q. Did he say the following then-did he 
say 'The following statement to David W. Mur-
ray and J. Eldon Dunn, who have identified 
themselves to me as Special Agents of the Fede-
ral Bureau of Investigation.' Did he make that 
statem·ent? 
A. No, he didn't make that statement. 
Q. As far as the statement, the language 
generally throughout the entire statement, is 
either the language of you or Mr. Dunn, isn't itf 
A. I wouldn't say so. 
Q. What would you say? Do you think 
this young boy eighteen years of age, dictated 
this language to the girl~ 
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s1r. 
Q. Did he dictate it in any part of the 
paragraph·? 
A. That is the story as he told it, reduced 
to writing. 
Q. vVho 'vas the one that dictated it to the 
stenographer. 
A. )!r. Dunn and myself, with the assist-
ance of Mr. Mares. 
Q. Did Mr. Mares make any dictation to 
the girl1 
A, He made statements th~t -we repeated 
to the girl. 
Q. In other words, all the dictation that the 
girl took came f:rom you and Mr. Dunn; isn't 
that correct¥ 
A. I would say that she took down what we 
dictated. 
Q. And what statements she took down,· 
she took down from you and Mr. Dunn ; isn't that 
correct' 
A. Yes, I would say we dictated the state-
ment. 
Q. You didn't ever ask the witness to write 
down the statement in his own handwriting, did 
you? 
A. No, I didn't ask him. 
Q. You didn't think it was good p~rocedure 
to have the court reporter take the questions: you 
propounded to l\lr. Mares, and then take his 
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answers that he gave hack, in his own la·nguage; 
(PT 268) you didn't follow any such procedure 
as that, did you~ 
A. Not as we are doing today ... 
Q. I am not asking ·about those things. 1 
am asking you if, in the presence of Mr. Du;nn, 
you told him he could have -a lawyer? 
A. Not sp,eci fically. . . . ( PT 269) . 
Q. I ,am asking you if you told, him he could 
have a lawyer? 
A. I don't recall w·hether or not we said 
that to him. 
Q. Did Mtr. Dwnn ever tell him he co-uld 
have a tawyer? 
A. I don't recall specifically that we t.old 
him that. 
Q. After the young lady took this state-
metnt down and then transcribed it in its pres-ent 
form, when you came back in the room the boy 
was crying, w~asn't he? 
A. He cried several times in m.y presence 
and in that of Mr. Dwnn. 
Q. You went and got him some aspirin, 
didn't you! 
A. I don't recall that I did, spe-cifically .. 
. . (PT 270) 
Q. Did you tell him he could have his father 
here before he signed it~ (PT 271). 
A. I didn't tell him that. 
Q. Did anybody~ 
A. I don't recall anyone did. 
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Q. Did you tell him he could. have a lG!W-
yer here to ad vise hirn whether to sign it or not. 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did anybody? 
A. I don't reoall whether anybody did.'' 
MRS. AFTON KURNS, at the preliminary hearing, 
testified that she took the statement of the alleged con-
fession, Exhibit 'P', down in shorthand. The actual 
language was dictated by one of the two agents, namely 
J. Eldon Dunn and David W. Murray. ('PT 277). 
C. K. KEETER, Chief of Dectectives of the Ogden 
Police Department, testified at: the preliminary hearing 
as follows, regarding the condition of the plaintiff here~ 
in during the time of the interview while he was there : 
(PT 314) 
'' Q. Do you recall somehody getting him 
some asperin ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. A:r:e yon sure he wasn't crying, and 
somebody went and got him three asperin, and 
gave it to him~ -· 
· A. . I wouldn't be positive. I don't recol-
lect. ( PT 315). 
Q. You remernber him getting asperin. 
A. Yes. 
Q. He said he had a splitting headache~ 
A. I think I sent the jailer after the asperin. 
Q. He told .you he had a splitting headaehe '? 
A. Yes .... (PT 317) .. 
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Q. Did anybody say he could have a law-
yer' 
A. No, I don't think they did. 
Q. Di'd 'anybody say he could have his 
father? He was a minor only eighteen years of 
age! (PT 318). 
A. He didn't ask for them. 
Q. You have got an eighteen year old kid~ 
A. Not in my presence, and I don't think an 
attorney or his father, either one, were men-
tioned.'' 
During the interview, and at the time the alleged 
confession was signed, plaintiff herein complained of a 
bad headache and an asperin was given to him after he 
signed the alleged confession. (R. 380). 
9. The alleged written confession identified as 
State's Exhibit ''E'' at the preliminary hearing and 
State's Exhibit "P" at the trial, was signed by the 
plaintiff at approximately 10:30 P.M. on the night of 
August 18th. CPT 213.). This alleged written confes-
sion of the !p,laintiff and the alleged conversation testi.:. 
fie<;l to by P. H. Neeley covering conversations with the 
plaintiff at the Ogden jail in Weber County on August 
18, 1946, and alleged conversations with the plaintiff on 
August 19, 1946, as testified to by P. H. Neeley during 
the trip to the scene of the alleged crime, together with 
the procedure, demonstrations and conduct of the plain-
tiff on said trip, were a substantial factor in the con-
viction of plaintiff of the charge of first degree murder. 
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That on said trip \Vhen the plaintiff was requested 
to state "'"hat had happened at Hoytsville where the body 
was placed in the canal, P. H. Neeley testified as fol-
lows: (R. 328) 
· · Q. .AJl right, then what happened~ 
.. ..\... 1\lr. Fisher stopped the car and that was 
on the south side of the culvert that crosses the 
Hoytsville irrigation canal there where the road 
passes over: and I remember the Sheriff of Mor-
gan County (R. 329) asked Mr. Mares if he would 
get out and Mr. ~1:ares hesitated at that point 
and the Sheriff asked him kindly to get out and 
told him: ''SOMETIME YOU WILL HAVE TO 
niEET THIS ANYHOW'; and that Mr. Mares 
got out with the Sheriff of Morgan County. 
Q. What then was said or done~ 
A. He was taken to the north side of the 
bridge, the west side of the highway, where Mr. 
Mares -said: 'Here is where the car stopped. 
Here is where I took the body out and I placed 
it under this bridge. After I had placed it un-
der this bridge I took a pump and cleaned the 
gasoline line out and then drove as fast as I 
could along the road you have brought me over, 
toward Salt Lake City.' 
Q. Then what was done or said there, 
please? 
A. :Jfr. Mares said that he took the body 
and placed it under the bridge on dry ground." 
10. Plaintiff Eliseo J. Mares,. Jr., denied that he 
ever read the alleged written confession known as Ex-
hibit "P" before he signed it. He denied, further, that 
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he knew what it contained. The following excerpt~ are 
taken from his testimony: (R. 542, 545, 573, 574) 
'' Q. , I will ask you, at that time, while you 
were in the automobile, sitting in the back seat, 
as you have indicated, who else was there in the 
back seat' 
A. That sheriff of Morgan County, Mr. 
Bernard Dahlquist, and Earl Bagnell. 
Q. Who was in the front seat~ 
A. P. H. Neeley and Sheriff Fisher. 
Q. I will ask you if, at any time, while you 
were sitting in that back seat, in the presence of 
these other gentlemen, if Mr. Neeley had this 
conversation with you: 
'I asked Mr. Mares when he conceived doing 
this. He said when Mr. Stallings drove the car 
over the Utah-Wyoming boundary line that Mr. 
Stallings woke Mr. Mares up. Mr. Mares at that 
time (R. 543) he said, Mr. Mares said at that time 
he was sleeping in the back seat of the car, and 
he said Stallings said : 'We are entering Utah. ' 
Mares then opened his suitcase, changed his 
shirt, took the gun and laid it on the side of the 
back seat, and said that he made up his mind to 
kill Stallings, and take that car coming down 
Echo Canyon.' 
Did he ever have such a conversation with you 
at that time' 
A. He did not. 
Q. Did he have any such conversation with 
you at any time 1 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Did you ever stat~ the substance of this 
c.onversation to ~[r. Neeley, or anyone else~ 
. ..-\.. I did, but not those words. 
Q. ''-rhen did you Inake a statement to Mr. 
X eeley, or in his presence, of anything that oc-
curred in Wyoming~ 
A. I made a state1nent in Ogden. 
Q. What day was that~ 
.. A.. About two days after I was arrested. 
Q. That would be on the 18th of August. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was it~ 
A. Sir~ 
Q. Where were you at that time. 
A. They brought me down to talk to the 
Sheriff, Fisher. 
Q. Where was that, that place~ 
A. In the jail down there. (R. 544). 
Q. In Ogden~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who else was present, if you remember1 
A. S.heriff Fisher, Mr. Neeley and myself. 
Q. What did you say, if anything, to them~ 
A. They asked me if I had been thinking 
of killing him. All I said to them was : 'It is a 
wonder he did not get killed in Wyoming.' 
Q. Did you say anything else about a car~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. What did you say~ 
A. I said I planned to steal a car in Wyo-
ming. 
Q. Did you ever at any time tell Mr. Fisher 
or Mr. Neeley that you planned to steal that car~ 
A. No, sir:' a car.' 
Q. What were you referring to, in this 
conversation, about taking a car in Wyoming~ 
A. I was referring to the one that a man 
got out of, in that joint that Jack went into, to 
wash his hands. He was drunk. 
Q. Where was that joint you are talking 
about~ 
A. In Evanston. 
Q. Did you ever tell anyone that you 
planned to kill Jack Stallings for the purpose of 
stealing and taking his car~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. At any time or any rp~lace 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You had an interview with Mr. Dunn 
and Mr. Murray, did you not, in the County Jail 
in O·gden~ (R. 545), 
A. Yes, sir. 
Did you ever tell either one of those gentle-
men-
A. (Interposing) No, sir. 
Q. (Continued) Any information to that 
effect¥ 
A. The information I gave then1 'vas-all I 
said to them was what I told Mr. Neeley, that it 
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\Va~ a "·onder that Jack did not get killed in Wy-
oining. They asked 1ne to repeat that, and I did 
not repeat it. 
Q. You did not rep·eat it~ 
~\. I did not. 
Q. Did you ever disclose to them what hap-
pened in thi~ tavern up here by the State line~ 
... \. I did not. 
Q. \Y.hy didn't you~ 
... \. Because I did not know whether I had 
killed that 1nan or not. 
Q. Did you disclose to anybody that infor-
mation-that is, up till the time that you were 
arrested, I mean up until the 19th day of August~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And the reason for that was what~ 
A. Because I was afraid that if ,.I had 
killed a man in Wyoming I would be blamed for 
both of them. 
Q. Did you ever have any animosity toward. 
Jack Stallings~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did he toward you~ 
A. No, sir." 
(R. 573) 
Q. Why did you tell Mr. Neeley that Jack 
was stooping over to look at his shoes, or the 
door, and that you took the gun and put it 
through the window and shot him in the head~ 
A. I did not tell him that.· Mr. Neeley made 
that up. When he asked 1ne if it was that way 
l accepted that. 
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Q. You did not tell him that~ 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Dunn that, and Mr. 
Murray~ 
A. They done that themselves and I did not 
put no objection to it. 
Q. Did you tell them that~ 
A. I did not. 
Q. You signed this Exhibit-you have seen 
it, haven't you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew it said that in there, didn't 
you? 
it. 
A. I don't know what it said in there. 
Q. Never read it~· 
A. I glanced through it but I did not read · 
Q. Didn't you know what it said? 
(R. 574) 
A. I knew it said I had killed Jack. I did 
not care then. 
Q. You were not interested in how this 
statement said you had killed him~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You did not think that mattered~ 
A. No, I did not eare then. 
Q. Why didn't you care~ 
A. I don't know. 
Q. What is that~ 
A. I don't know.'' 
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11. On the 21st of August, 1946, a criminal com-
plaint "?as lodged against the plaintiff wherein he was 
charged with murder; a warrant was issued thereon and 
.Jlares was brought before the committing magistrate 
Willian1 H. Chappell, Justice of the Peace at Coalville, 
Utah. At this appearance plaintiff was not represented 
by counsel nor was he apprised of his rights to have 
counsel (see Justice's Court proceedings), but the com-
nutting magistrate continued the preliminary hearing to 
the 28th day of August, 1946, when he was again brought 
before the said magistrate and there advised that he 
was entitled to counsel "in every stage of the proceed-
ings.'' Plaintiff then stated that ''he did not want an 
attorney,'' but the magistrate being of the opinion that 
he should have counsel again continued the matter until 
the 9th day of September, 1946, in order that an attorney 
might be arranged for. On August 30, 1946, two lawyers 
were appointed by the District Court to represent the 
accused and these attorneys then arranged for another 
postponement until October 7, 1946. On that date the 
attorney who had been retained by the family of the 
accused entered his appearance, whereupon the two law-
yers appointed by the court withdrew and the prelimin-
ary hearing was commenced and concluded the follow-
ing day. Upon the termination of this hearing the plain-
tiff herein was bound over for trial on the charge of 
murder in the first degree. Plaintiff did not see or tal~ 
with any lawyer, friends, parents or relatives from the 
time he was arrested on August 16th until the 30th day 
of August, 1946, when the two attorneys appointed by 
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the District Court talked to him in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. (See Justice's Court proceeding.) (AF 4) 
12. The plaintiff was found guilty of first degree 
murder and sentenced to be shot, as shown by the judg-
ment and sentence and commitment attached to plain-
tiff's petition for Habeas Corpus. That the reputation 
of plaintiff, Eliseo J. Mares, Jr. for being a law abiding 
citizen up until the time he was inducted in the- United 
States Army on or about Novem·ber 26, 1945, at the age 
of 18 years was ex cell en t. ( R. 495). 
13. There were 39 members of the panel of pros-
pective jurors; 4 were excused for cause as active clients 
of P. H. Neeley; 3 were excused for cause for reason 
of fixed opinions. Of the remaining 32, 26 personally 
know P. H. Neeley and 20 of the 26 were fqrlmer clients 
of P. H. Neeley. Of the 12 jurors who were chosen to 
try the case, 10 were the personal friends of P. H. 
Neeley and 7 of the 10 were former clients of P. H. 
Neeley. The foreman of the jury was the Bishop of the 
Church where P. H. Neeley was a High Priest in the 
·eccle-siastical stake, which included the ecclesiastical 
ward presided over by said foreman as the Bishop 
thereof. That plaintiff's. counsel knew prior to the time 
that the jury was sworn that the individual who subse-
quently became foreman of the jury was a Bishop in 
said Church and that said P. H. Neeley was the County 
Attorney and an active church man, but neither plaintiff 
nor his counsel knew at that time that the ~State was 
going to use said County Attorney as its major witness 
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at the trial, the said County Attorney's nan1e not having 
been endorsed on the information as a witness in accord-
ance with the Statute and practjce in said state. (AF. 6) 
ST.A.TEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF PETITION-
ER'S ALLEGED ·CONFESSION VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS 
UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION- .OF .THE 
UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7 ARTICLE I ',OF THE· 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
2. THE FAILURE TO FURNISH TO PLAINTIFF, WHO. 
WAS ACCUSED OF A CAPITAL OFFENSE, THE AID OF 
COUNSEL DURING HIS INCARCERATION FROM THE 
TIME HE WAS ARRESTED ON THE 16TH DAY OF AUG-
UST, 1946, UNTIL HE WAS TAKEN BEFORE THE COM.;. 
MITTING MAGISTRATE ON THE 28TH OF AUGUST, 194_6, 
WAS A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PRO;GESS CLAUSE._OF: 
THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7 ARTICLE _I OF· 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. ·. ,· ·:.\) 
3. THE ADMISSION IN EVIDEN,CE OF STATEMENTS 
ELICITED FROM PLAINTIFF DURING HIS TWELVE-DAY 
PERIOD OF INCARCERATION, AT WHICH TIME HE WAS 
WITHOUT COUNSEL, RELATIVES, GUARDIANS AND 
FRIENDS, AND HAD NOT BEEN INFORM;ED .OF_· t.llS,_ 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL; AND FURTHERMORE TH;E ~Dl\1I~~~ 
SION IN EVIDEN.CE OF TESTIMONY CONCEifNlNG- A 
PURPORTED RE-ENACTMENT OF THE CRIME 'STAGED~ 
WITHOUT A COURT ORDER THREE DAYS .AFTER~~TJ:f'E'i: 
ACCUSED. HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND. WHILE HE· WAS~ 
STILL BEING HELD ILLEGALLY BY THE POLICE ANO 
DETECTION OFFICIALS WITHOUT ASSISTANCE- OF 
CO·UNSEL, RELATIVES, GUARDIANS AND FRIENDS VIO-
LATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE~ 
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OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF 'THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7 ARTI-
CLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
4. IT IS A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDEMENT OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7 
ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND SEC-
TION 105-13-17 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, TO ADl\1IT 
IN EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED CON-
FESSIONS AND STATEMENTS ELICITED FROM THE 
A1GCUSED DURING ILLEGAL DETENTION DUE TO FAIL-
URE PROMPTLY TO GARRY A PRISONER BEFORE ·A 
COMMITTIN~G MAGISTRATE. 
ARGUMENT 
PROPOSITION I. THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF 
PETITIONER'S ALLEGED CONFESSION VIOLATED HIS 
RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7 ARTICLE I 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
At the time of plaintiff's arrest on August 16, 1946, 
at Ogden, Utah, plaintiff was 18 years of age. He had 
been inducted into the United States Army some nine 
months p~rior to his arrest. ( AF 6; R. 495) There is 
nothing in the record to show that plaintiff .was skilled 
in the law. His reputation for being a law abiding 
citizen up until the time he was inducted into the United 
States Army on or about November 26, 1945, at the age 
of 18 years, was excellent. (R. 495; AF 5) Hence, it 
must be concluded that this young boy at the time of his 
arrest was totally unfamiliar with criminal procedures, 
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and certainly not a\\Tare of his constitutional rights 
under the criminal law. 
The plaintiff was arrested on the evening of August 
16, 1946, at about 8:30 P.M. and was taken to the Ogden 
City jail where he was booked by desk sergeant Howard 
K. Keeter. -When plaintiff asked, ''What is it all about?'' 
Keeter told him, '·We just wanted to do. a little inves-
tigating, that was all.'' (PT 108; AF 2)' 
P. H. Neeley, County 'Attorney ·of Summit County, 
wno prepared th~ case for the prosecution from its in-
ception:, interviewed plaintiff on the 17th of August at' 
the Ogden City Jail. In that conversation he told plain~· 
tiff that he had two lawyers for him, but no lawyers ever 
contacted plaintiff until after he was taken before the 
committing magistrate August 28, 1946. (R. 363; AF· 3-) 
On the evening of August 17th Neeley brought 
people into the Ogden jail to identify plaintiff as the 
man who sold the decedent's .car to Mr. Wistisen. He 
would have plaintiff walk out from a little side room 
in the Police Department and see if these people could 
identify him. (R. 363-372; AF 2) 
After this interview on the 17th of August, tw,o 
special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
namely J. Eldon Dunn and David W. Murray, were 
sent to Ogden to interrogate the plainti~. These special 
agents were not legally trained investigators,. but ~ere 
used by the F.B.I. during the period of the war by reason 
of the shortage of specially trained lawyers regula~ly 
employed by this Federal Bureau. They were closeted 
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with the plaintiff from two o'clock until seven o'clock 
on- the afternoon of August 18th. The interrogation of 
the plaintiff occupied aptproximately five hours' time. 
During said period Mr. Dunn took notes of what plain- i 
tiff told him. These notes were introduced in evidence I 
as part of the cross-examination of Mr. Dunn. (R. 414; : 
AF 2) It was during this period of questioning that 1 
the alleged confession of plaintiff was obtained. The 1 
entire alleged confession of the plaintiff, after ap·prox-
imately five hours of questioning, was dictated by these 
two special agents of the F.B.I. to the stenographer 
of the Chief of Police. (R. 413-429; PT. 264-269; AF 2) I 
This typewritten statement, dictated by these two spe-
cial agents, was allowed by the court to be introduced 
in evidence at the trial of the plaintiff and was a sub-
stantial factor in his conviction. (AF 5) During the 
examination of plaintiff by these sp·ecial agents, plain-
tiff was not advised of his rights to counsel. · (R. 426, 
427; PT 268, 269; AF 3) 
It should be noted that the alleged confession secured 
from plaintiff is repugnant to and positively inconsistent 
with the factual evidence as given by the State's own 
witness. The State called Mrs. Gladys Richins Jones 
as its witness. Mrs. Jones lives on the Echo· Canyon 
road about two city blocks east of the iJOint of the alleged 
killing of Stallings. She testified that in the latter part 
of June, to-wit, around th_e 23rd or 24th of the month, 
she was awakened in the early hours of the morning by 
a ,car traveling west on the road in front of their home; 
that she heard a man crying for help as the car pro-
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, c.eeded do"~n to the point of the alleged slaying .. When-
~ the car stopped she heard a voice say, "don.'t, don,'t, 
: don •t do it,·· then she heard a shot and after a period of 
: quiet the car backed up and turned around and went. 
• back up the road past her home; she got to the window 
just after the shot was fired; she saw the car turn back 
onto the road and travel back east past her home toward 
the town of Eeho. (R. 436-451). 
The confession dictated by the special agents ~f the 
F.B.I. bespeaks a surreptitious killing and no place' does 
it refe·r to calls for "help". The pertinent part is'_:-as 
follows: 
"After Jack stopped the car by the side of 
the road, we decided to rest there awhile, and 
I got in the back seat. I had already taken the: 
pistol out of my suitcase and placed it on the 
rear seat. I did this near Evanston, Wyqr.ning,, 
when I changed shirts after we had stopp~d·for· 
a brief rest. After Jack stop·ped the car, 'I·. gof 
out of the front seat into the back seat and' was· 
sitting there when Jack got out of the car_ o;n 
the right side of the front seat and stood by the 
car. He was bending over slightly by the side 
of the car with his head a little below the level 
of the car windows. I picked up the gun which 
was on the rear seat beside me and extende~: it 
through the rear side window on the· ~i,g}Jt : sige. 
of the car, close to Jack's head and shot once.' 
Following the shot he immediately fen· fo:· the) 
ground without uttering a sound. I Wa:S .very:·, 
frightened and wanted to run away, but decided 
not to do that." (R. 399-408) 
This point is presented by plaintiff, not to show 
error of judgment by court or jury, but rather to dem-
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with the plaintiff from two o'clock until seven o'clock 
on the afternoon of August 18th. The interrogation of 
the plaintiff oc.cupied ap~proximately five hours' time. 
During said period Mr. Dunn took notes of what plain-
tiff told him. These notes were introduced in evidence 
as part of the cross-examination of Mr. Dunn. (R. 414; 
AF 2) It was during this period of questioning that 
the alleged confession of plaintiff was obtained. The 
entire alleged confession of the plaintiff, after ap~prox­
imately five hours of questioning, was dictated by these 
two special agents of the F.B.I. to the stenographer 
of the Chief of Police. (R. 413~429; p·T. 264-269; AF 2) 
This typewritten statement, dictated by these two spe-
cial agents, was allowed by the court to be introduced 
in evidence at the trial of the plaintiff and was a sub-
stantial factor in his conviction. (AF 5) During the 
examination of plaintiff by these sp~ecial agents, plain-
tiff was not advised of his rights to counsel.· (R. 426, 
427; PT 268, 269; AF 3) 
It should be note-d that the alleged confession secured 
from plaintiff is repugnant to and positively inconsistent 
with the factual evidence as given by the State's own 
witness. The State called Mrs. Gladys Richins Jones 
as its witness. Mrs. Jones lives on the Echo· Canyon 
road about two city blocks east of the 1JOint of the alleged 
killing of Stallings. She testified that in the latter part 
of June, to-wit, around the 23rd or 24th of the month, 
she was awakened in the early hours of the morning by 
a ·car traveling west on the road in front of their home; 
that she heard a man crying for help as the car pro-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
c.eeded down to the point of the allege,d slaying .. W}l~11 
the car stopped she heard a voice say, '' dQn.'t, don't, 
don't do it,'' then she heard a shot and after a period of 
quiet the car backed up and turned around and went. 
back up the road past her home; she got to the window 
just after the shot was fired ; she saw the car turn back 
onto the road· and travel back east past her home toward. 
the town of Echo. (R. 436-451). 
The confession dictated by the special agents of the 
F.B.I. bespeaks a surreptitious killing and no .phice'·· noes 
it refe·r to calls for "help,". The pertinent part ·is ··as 
follows: . 
''After Jack stopped the ear by the side of 
the road, we decided to rest there awhile, and 
I got in the back seat. I had already taken the: 
pistol 'out of my suitcase and placed it on the. 
rear seat. I did this near Evanston, W yqr.niD:g, . 
when I changed shirts after we had stoppE1d ·fo-r· 
a brief rest. After Jack stop·ped the car, I~· gof 
out of the front seat into the back seat and was·. 
sitting there when Jack got out of the car. ~~ 
the right side of the front seat and stood by the 
car. He was bending over slightly by the side 
of the car with his head a little below the level 
of the car windows. I picked up the gun which 
was on the rear seat beside me and extended ,_it 
through the rear side window on the. right : si.de 
of the car, close to Jack's head and shot once.' 
Following the shot he immediately fell fo:·the:: 
ground without uttering a sound. I was :Very:.·· 
frightened and wanted to run away, but decided 
not to do that." (R. 399-408) 
.. This point is presented by plaintiff, not to show 
error of judgment by court or jury, but rather to dem-
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onstrate how inconsistent this alleged confession is 
when compared with the facts given by the State's own 
witness. Furthermore,· this witness, Mrs. Gladys Richins 
Jones, was the only direct witness to the alleged killing. 
The only conclusion is that the alleged confession was 
not freely and voluntarily given by plaintiff, but rather 
a figment of imagination of the two special agents of 
the F.B.I. w·ho dictated it. 
It is plaintiff's contention that an alleged confession 
se~ured under these circumstances is inadmissible on the 
grounds that it was secured by force and coercion. It is 
not evident from the record whether physical violence, 
torture or threats. thereof were used, but psychological 
pressure and mental fear are abundantly demonstrated. 
An 18 year old boy arrested, interviewed by police offi-
cers, detectives, prosecutors and finally on the third day 
after his arrest, after five hours of examination by two 
F.B.I. agents, he agrees to sign an alleged confession 
dictated by these two F.B.I. agents to the stenographer 
of the Chief of Police. Mr. Murray, one of the special 
agents, testified that during their examination: ''He 
cried several times in my presence and in that of Mr. 
Dunn.'' (PT 269) C. K. Keeter, Chief of Detectives of 
the Ogden Police Department, testified that plaintiff 
complained of a ''splitting headache,'' during the time 
of the interview while Keeter was there. ( PT 314-318; 
AF 2). .. .. . . ... . . . .. _ 
The protection which the Constitutions of the United 
States and the State of Utah provide was denied this 
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young boy. Without the protection and advice of family, 
friends, relatives or counsel, he was subjected to inces:-
sant questioning by police, detectives, prosecutors, spe:-
cial agents of the F.B.I. It is a foregone conclusion that 
in the mind of this young boy the power of these officers 
of the la'v was greatly magnified. 
The uncontroverted facts bring this case . square~y 
within the host of decisions, the ·p·rinciples of whi~4-:·a:~e. 
summarized in ~fcNABB v. UNI·TED STATE.S, !·3i8. 
U.S. 322, 340: ''. . . this Court has, on Constitutional 
grounds, set aside convictions, both in the Federal and 
State Courts, which were based upon confessions se·cu·red 
by protracted and r·epeated questioning of ignoranf and 
untutored persons, in whose minds the power of officers· 
was greatly magnified: LISENBA v. CALIFbRNIA; 
314 U.S. 219, 239, 240; 86 L. Ed. 166, 181, 182; J{i2 S. Ct.': 
280, or 'who have been unlawfully held incommu:riieai<lo: 
'vithout advice of friends or counsel': WARD v. TE:1.~AS, 
316 U.S. 547, 555; 86 L. Ed. 166.3, 1667; 62 S. Ct.. 1;139.; 
and see BROWN v. MIS'S,ISSIPPI, 297 U.S ... 27~; 80. L. 
Ed. 682; 56 S. Ct. 461; CHAMBERS v. FL:ORI~Ai. 
309 U.S. 227; 84 ~- Ed. 716; 60 S .. Ct. 472; CANT.~ v. 
ALABAMA, 309 U.S. 629; 84 L. Ed. 988; 60 S. _J:Jt .. ·.-p:~.? 7· 
WHITE v. TEXAS, 310 U.S. 530; 84 L. Ed. __ 1342.i ~0 
S. Ct. 1932; LOMAX v. TE·XAS, 313 U.!S.. 54.4;. -~5 Ic4~ 
Ed. 1511; 61 S. Ct. 956; VERNO·N v. ALABAM'A;":·_~i3 
U.S. 54 7; 85 L. Ed. 1513; 61 S. Ct. 1092. '' 
In the case of WATTS v. STATE OF INDIANA, 
338 U.S. 49; 69 S. Ct. 1347 (1949) the United States 
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Supreme Court reversed a .conviction for murder where 
the evidence showed that the accused had been question-
ed incessantly, had not been taken p·romptly before a 
magistrate and was not advised of his constitutional 
rights, and that during this period of time a confession 
was secured which was used in accused's conviction. 
The Court held that there had been a denial of due 
process of law in violation of the 14th Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United 'States. 
The Court stated at prage 52: ''There is torture of 
mind as w·ell as body; the will is as mu)_ch affected by 
fear as by force. And there comes a point where this 
Court, should not be ignorant as judges of w~hat we know 
as men. See Taft, C. J., in the Child Labor Tax Case 
(BAILEY v. DREXEL FURNITURE CO.) 259 U.S. 
20, 37, 42 s.-· Ct. 449, 450, 451; 66 L. Ed. 817, 21 A.L.R. 
1432. '' 
Page 53: "A confess~on by W'hich life bli{;omes fo·r-
feit must be the expression of f.ree choice. A. st,atement 
to be voluntary of course nee:d not be volrwnteered. But 
if it is the pr,odtuct, .of sustained pressure by the police 
it does not issue from a free choice. When a suspect 
speaks becOJUSe he is oveiborne, it is immaterial w·he·ther 
he has been subjected to ra physioal or mental o·rde~al. 
Eventual _yielding to questio'Yiiitn,g 'IJJ'nder such circum ... 
stances is p,Zainly the pro1d/uct of t,he suction pro1c-ess o/ 
interrog-ation and therefore the r-everse of volunt-ary.'' 
Page 54: TO TURN THE DE·TENTION OF AN 
ACCUSED INTO A PROC-ESS OF WRENCHING 
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FRO~I HIM E'-riDENCE WHICH CO·ULD NOT·. BE 
EXTORTED IN OPEN COURT WITH ALL ·ITS 
SAFEGUARDS, IS' so GRA\TE AN ABUIS,E OF THE 
POWER OF ARREST AS TO OFFEND THE PRO-· 
CEDURAL STANDARDS O·F DUE PROCES1S~. 
'~This is so because it violates the underlying prin~ 
ciple in our enforcement of the criminal law. .Ours is 
the accusatorial 'as opposed to the inquisitorial' SYStelll. 
Such has been · the characteristic of Anglo~American: 
criminal justice since it freed itself from practices b'or-
rowed by the Star Chamber from the Continent whereby. 
an accused was interrogated in secret for hours on end . 
. . . Under our system society carries the burden of 
proving its charge against the accused not out _of his 
. .r 
own mouth. It must establish its case, not by inter-:-
rogation of the accused even under judicial safe~~r4~,: 
but by evidence independently secured through. 8ki\J,f#l 
investigation. 'The law will not suffer a prisoner t~· ·be~ 
made the deluded instrwnent of his own conviction.' 
2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, c. 46 Par. 34 (8th __ ~d. 
1824). The requirement of specific charges, their pr,qof 
bey01Ul, a reasonable douJJt, the protection of the ~~~~,, 
from confessions extorted through whatever form of 
police presswres, the right to a pr·ompt he~arif!,g.1 .Pf3.JO!re 
a magistrate, the right to assist·ance of coiun$el,. to- ·:be. 
supplied by· g;overnment when circu.mstances ·make it 
necessary, the duty to advise an accused of his 'Consti-
tuttonal rights-these are all characteristics of the accu.-
satorial system -arnd manifest~ations of its dem~a'l?tds..'' 
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· Page· 55: ''In holding the Due Pro-cess Clause bars 
police procedure which violates the basic notions of our 
accusatorial mode of ~P'rosecuting crime and vitiates a 
conviction based on the fruits of such procedure, we 
apply the Due Process Clause to its historic fun·ction 
of assuring ·ap,propriate proced!ure before liberty is cur-
tailed or life is taken.'' 
Justice Douglas in a con~urring op1n1on states ·at 
page 57 : '' ... Detention without ~arraig,rnnnent is a time-
honored method for keepitn.g lUYb accus·ed 1JIIUler the ex-
cllusiv~ :cotnt~ol of. the police. They earn t:hen. ope;rat·e at 
their leisure. The accused is W'holly at their mercy. ·He 
is W'ithovut the ~aid ·of counsel or friends; and he is denied 
the ·pro~t.ection of the m,agistrate. We should un.equivo-
oally condemn the proc.edtUre amd stand re~ady to outlaw, 
as we did in Malimski v. Peorp1le ·of ~Stale 10{ New York, 
324 U. 8. 401, 65 B. Ct. 781, 89 L. Ed. 1029 and Haley v. 
State of Ohio, 332 U. 8. 596, 68 8. Ct. 302, 92 L. E_d. 
224, an~Ay c.o~fessi·on obtained during the period of t:he 
wnJawful de:tention. The procetl!Ure bree·ds coerced con-· 
fessiovns. It is the ro-ot of the evil. It Vis the proced/ure 
without ··which the inquisition oould not flo'urish in the 
count·ry. '' 
For .two other recent United iStates Supreme Court 
decisions decided in 1949, and bearing on this same point 
see TURNER v. CO·MMO·NWEALTH OF PENNSYL-
VANIA, 358 U;S. 6·2, 69 Supreme Ct. 1'352 (1949); also 
see HARRIS v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 338 
U.S. 68, 69 S. Ct. 13'54 ( 1949) . 
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In MALINSKI ET AL. v. NEW YORK, 324 U.S. 
401, 404, the court stated: ··If ·all the attendoot ci.r-
cum,stances indicate that the confession W·as coerced~ or 
compelled, it nzay not be u.sed to convict a defendant. 
ASHCRAFT v. TENN. 332 U.S. 143, 154. A(Ylid if it is 
introduced at the trial the jt«lgment of conviction w'ill 
be set aside even though the evidence apart from the con-
fession might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's 
verdict; LYO·NS v. OKLAHOMA, 322 U.S. 596, 597." 
PROPOSITION II. THE FAILURE TO FURNISH TO PLAIN--
TIFF, WHO WAS ACCUSED OF A CAPITAL OFFENSE, _ 
THE AID OF ·COUNSEL DURING HIS INCARCERATION 
FROM .THE TIME HE WAS ARRESTED ON THE 16TH 
DAY- OF AUGUST, 1946, UNTIL HE WAS TAKEN BEFORE 
THE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE ON THE 28TH OF AUG-
UST, 1946, WAS A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7 
ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff :was arrested and taken into custody by the 
police on August 16, 1946, (R. 495; AF 6). The follow-
ing day on August 17th plaintiff was interviewed by the 
County Attorney, P. H. Neeley. That evening of the 
same day plaintiff was again interviewed by Neeley 
and also was exposed to the view of certain persons 
brought to the jail by P. H. Neeley for purposes of 
identification. During these interviews P. H. Neeley, 
County Attorney for Summit County, told petitioner 
he had two lawyers for him, but no lawyers ever con-
tacted plaintiff until after he was taken before the com-
mitting magistrate. (R. 363-372; AF 2). On the 18th 
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of August, 1946, plaintiff was again questioned. This 
time two special investigators of the F.B.I. made the 
examination and after five ·hours of questioning, an 
alleged confession was dictated by these two special 
agents to the Chief of Police's stenographer and app~rox­
imately three hours later, or 10:00 P.M., plaintiff signed 
it. (R. 414; AF· 2). During the examination of plaintiff 
by these two special agents of the F.B.I. plaintiff was 
without the aid of family, friends or relatives, and par-
ticularly without the aid of counsel. Plaintiff was never 
advised of his rights to counsel, or that he .might have 
his father, etc., present to advise him. (R. 423-427; PT 
269-271 ; AF 3). The two special agents of the F.B.I. 
who secured the alleged confession testified concerning; 
this matter. 
MR. J. ELDO·N DUNN testified as follows: (R. 
427) 
'' Q. Yon did not advise this boy he could have a 
lawyer, did you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. At any time? 
A. No, sir .... 
Q. (By Mr. McCullough) : I believe you stated 
yesterday, Mr. Dunn, that a.t no time did you advise 
Mr. Mares he could have a lawyer or should have a 
lawyer. 
A. That is right, yes, sir. 
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Q. You never heard anyone in your presence a.t 
any time during this interview from two o'clock until 
seven o'clock, w·hen you returned back to have this ex-
hibit, the alleged confession, signed, you never heard 
any of these people present advise him he could have a 
lawyert 
A. That is right.'' 
~IR. DA \"1:D W. MURRAY testified as follows: (PT 
268-271) 
'' Q. I an1 not asking about those things. I am 
asking you if, in the presence of Mr. Dunn, you told 
him he could have a lawyer! 
A. Not specifically. 
Q. I am asking you if you told him he could have 
a lawyerY 
A. I don't recall whether or not we said that to 
him. 
Q. Did Mr. Dunn ever tell him he could have a 
lawyer! 
A. I don't recall specifically that we told him that. 
Q. After the young lady took this statement down 
and then transcribed it in its present form, when you 
came back in the room the boy was crying wasn't he~ 
A. He cried several times in my presence and in 
that of .Mr. Dunn. 
Q. · You went and got him some aspirin, didn't 
you! 
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A. I don't recall I did specifically .... 
Q. Did you tell him he could have his father here 
before he signed it? 
A. I didn't tell him that. 
Q. Did anybody? 
A. I don't recall anyone did. 
Q. . Did you tell him he could have a lawyer here 
to advise him whether to sign it or not. 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did anybodyt 
A. I don't recall whether anybody did.'' 
C. K. KEETER, Chief of Detectives of the Ogden 
Police Department, testified at the preliminary hearing 
as follows: (PT 317, 318) 
Q. Did anyone say he could have a lawyer~ 
A. No I don't think they did. 
Q. Did ~nybody say he could have his father~ 
He was only a minor eighteen years of age~ 
A. He didn't ask for them. 
Q. You have got an eighteen year old kid~ 
A. Not in my presence, and I don't think any 
attorney or his father, either one, were mentioned.'' 
On the 19th of August, 1946, 'Plaintiff was taken 
by P. H. Neeley, County Attorney, and other officers 
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back over the route of the alleged crime. This was done 
\Yithout an order fron1 the court authorizing such -a 
procedure. (AF 3). On the 21st of August, 1946, a 
criminal con1plaint was lodged against plaintiff wherein 
he 'vas charged \Yith 1nurder; a warrant was issued 
thereon and plaintiff was brought before the committing 
n1agistrate ''Tilliam H. Chappell, Justice of the Peace 
at Coalville, Utah. At this appearance plaintiff was 
not represented by counsel nor was he apprised of his 
rights to have counsel, but the committing magistrate 
continued the prelinrinary hearing to the 28th day of 
August, 1946, when he was again brought before said 
magistrate and there advised that he w·as entitled to 
counsel '• in every st.age of the proce.edings. '' (See 
Justice's Court proceedings). (AF 4). Plaintiff then 
stated that he did not want an attorney, but the 
magistrate being of the opinion that he shoul·d 
have counsel again continued the matter. On August 
30, 1946, two lawyers were appointed by the District 
Court and for the first time since his incarceration, on 
August 16, 1946, he was represented by co~nsel and 
advised of his rights. The committing magistrate's 
statement that plaintiff was entitled to c?unsel ''in 
-every stage of the :proceedings'' was ironical at this 
stage of the proceedings. The very essence o~ a fair 
trial was already precluded if the testimony and alleged 
confessions which were secured during this period were 
allowed in evidence. This young boy needed counsel and 
fatherly advice during the period of time he was _held 
ineommunicado subjected to questioning . by the police, 
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detectives, and special agents of the F.B.I. The fears 
and anxiety of a boy this age held under similar cir-
cumstances such as was plaintiff, can readily be irnag-
ined. Testimony and alleged confessions secured under 
such circumstances, fraught with emotion, anxiety and 
fear could certainly never be considered by this court 
or the United States Supreme Court as "confess1ions, 
and testimony freely and' vo!Jwnt,arily given.'' The pro-
vision of the law requiring that plaintiff be taken prompt-
ly before a committing magistrate was enacted to pre-
clude the very thing which took place here. This safe-
guard if it had been allowed to plaintiff would not have 
permitted the violation of plaintiff's fundamental rights. 
(See 105-13-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1943). But, even 
this safeguard of fairness and justice was denied to 
plaintiff, during which time the police, detectives, spe-
cial agents, and county attorney could at their leisure 
exact from this boy the alleged confessions and state-
ments. 
In the ·case of WOOD v. UNITED STATES, 128 
F. 2d 265, at page 271, the court stated: The ,aid of 
counsel in prep,arration would be farc~cal if the oase 
could be fo·reclosed by prelimilnary inquisition w·hich 
would squeeze out conviction or prejudice by means 
unconstitutional if used at trial . ... '' 
Plaintiff was entitled to be rep·resented by counsel 
at the trial, at the preliminary hearing, and ''at eve.ry 
stage .of the proceedings,'' but from the time of his in-
carceration until the preliminary hearing, a period of 
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t\velve days, plaintiff "\\ras denied this fundamental right. 
If fairness and justice de1nand that an accused be rep-
resented by counsel in the conduct of his trial, then 
certainly fairness and justice demand that this young 
boy be represented by counsel during the twelve days he 
"~as held by the police and subjected to questioning and 
intervie\\Ts, all in derogation of his constitutional and 
legal rights of a prompt hearing before a com.mitting 
Inagistrate and the right to advice from family, friends, 
relatives and counsel. 
In GIBBS v. BURKE, 337 U.S. 773, 69 S. Ct. 1247 
(1949) the United States Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction of a defendant who was not offered counsel 
or adequate judicial guidance or !protection and of neces-
sity conducted his O"\vn defense. Even though ·the deci-
sion of the court in this case is based on the lack of 
counsel at the trial it has a definite bearing on the pres-
ent controversy and the question of violation of an 
accused's rights under Due Process. The court stated 
at pages 780 and 781 : '' ... Our decisions have been tha.t 
where the ignorance, youth, or o·ther incapacity of the 
defendant made .a trial without covunsel unfair, the de-
fendant ·is deprived of his liberty contrary to the F:oUJr-
teenth Amendment. Counsel necessary for his adequate 
defense would be lacking .... 
''Furthermore, the fair conduct ·01f ·a trial depends 
largely on the wisdont and wnderstarnding of the trial 
Judge. He knows the essentials of a fair trial. The 
prinLary duty falls -on him to determine the accused's 
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need of counsel at artraignment and d1:f;ring trial. He 
may gwide ·a defendant u.tithout a tawyer past the errors 
that make trWls Uhl),fair. . .. Failure to protect properly 
the rights of one accuse·d of a serious ·offense is UIYIIUSual. 
Ob·viously ·a fair trial test necessit~ates an appraisal 
b·efore ·(J;'nd druring the trial of the facts of each cas·e to 
determitne WHETHER THE NEED FOR COUNSEL 
WORKS A FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNE!S1S.'' 
See also, WATTS v. STATE O·F INDIANA, 338 
U.S. 49; 69 S. Ct. 1347 (1949; TURNER v. COMMON-
WEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 258 U.S. 62, 69 S. 
Ct. 1352 (1949); HARRIS v. S·TATE O·F :S.OUTH 
CAROLINA, 338 U.S. 68; 6'9 S. Ct. 1354 (1949). (All 
cited supra). 
PROPOSITION III. THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF 
STATEMENTS ELICITED FROM PLAINTIFF DURING HIS 
TWELVE-DAY PERIOD OF INCA~CERATION, AT WHICH 
TIME HE WAS WITHOUT COUNSEL, RELATIVES, GUARD-
IANS AND FRIENDS, AND HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED 
OF HIS RI,GHT TO COUNSEL; AND FURTHERMORE THE 
ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY CONCERN-
ING A PURPOR.TED RE-ENACTMENT OF THE CRIME 
STAGE·D WITHOUT A COURT ORDER THREE DAYS 
AFTER THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND 
WHILE HE WAS STILL BEIN'G HELD ILLEGALLY BY 
THE POLICE AND DETECTION OFFICIALS WITHOUT 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNS.EL, RELATIVES, GUARDIANS 
AND FRIENDS VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND SECTION 7 ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
u·TAH. 
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On the 19th day of August,·1946, plaintiff was taken 
by Sheriff George l\I. Fisher and others over the route 
he took fron1 the place 'vhere he threw the gun in 
linn1igration Canyon, back through Parley's Canyon to 
Hoytsville, \Yhere the body was placed in .the canal and 
over the scene of the alleged crime. There were two 
County Attorneys in this party, namely P. H. Neeley of 
Sununit County and a Mr. Conilel of Morgan County, a 
:Jir. Bernard Dahlquist, the Sheriff of Morgan County, 
~fr. Bagnell, a ·deputy sheriff of Summit County and 
l\Ir. London of the State Liquor Conrmission. Mr. 
Bagnell, ~Ir. Mares and Sheriff Dahlquist were sitting 
in the back seat of one car and P. H. Neeley and Sheriff 
George Fisher were sitting in the front seat of said car. 
~Ir. London rode in a second car. The conversations 
which P. H. Neeley testified he had with the 'P'laintiff 
covering every element of this alleged -crime were elicit-
ed from the plaintiff during this ride. There never was 
any court order in existence authorizing the taking of 
the plaintiff back over the route he had followed during 
the 24th of June, 1946, for the purpose of re-enacting 
the alleged crime. (R. 324-370; AF 3). This testimony, 
along with the alleged conversations also testified to 
by P. H. Neeley covering conversations with the plaintiff 
at the Ogden jail in Weber County on August 18, 1946, 
was allowed in evidence at the trial of the plaintiff over 
the objections of counsel, and was a substantial factor in 
the conviction of plain tiff of the charge of first degree 
111urder. (AF 5). 
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Even after securing an alleged confession from this 
boy, the police and prose-cuting officials still were not 
satisfied. Holding this boy incommunicado and. under 
their control was their means to secure the answers and 
testimony that they wanted. The argument which plain-
tiff has set forth in Proposition I of his Argument, 
regarding the admissibility of the alleged written con-
fession is equally pertinent here. P. H. Neeley's testi-
mony covering· the conversations with the plaintiff, his 
conduct and demonstrations, was a minute, detailed, 
extra-judicial confession by the plaintiff of guilt of the 
crime charged. (!S:ee Wharton's C-riminal Evidence, Vol. 
2, 11th Ed., par. ·579, 582; see also s~TATE v. MASATO 
KARUMAI, 101 Utah 592, at 601, 126 P .. 2d 1047, where-
in the court stated : ''A covnfess~on is the admission of 
guilt by the defenrJa;nt of all the necessary elements of 
the crime of w·hich he is charged, includritng the necessary 
acts (J!flid intent . ... ") A confession secured under these 
circumstances is not freely and voluntarily given, but 
rather coerced, and as such is inadmissible as evidence 
at the trial of the accused. Desp~ite objection thereto 
by counsel (R. 324, 337) for plaintiff, this testimony and 
confessions were admitted at the trial of the plaintiff 
all to his prejudice and in violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution of the United States and of 
the state of Utah. Without the advice of friends., rela-
tives or counsel this young boy was held ·-by the police 
and detection officials, held at the pleasure of these offi-
cials, denied his constitutional and legal right to a 
prompt preliminary hearing, subjected to their inces-
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sant questioning, and finally to bring the matter to a 
proper culn1ination he was taken by these officials, 
\vithout any authorization by a court or magistrate over 
the alleged route of the crime and an alleged re~enact­
Inent secured. It is interesting to note that P. H. Neeley, 
County Attorney, 'vho- prepared the case from its in-
ception and "Tho also presented the State~s case at the 
preliminary hearing, was called as a witness for~ the 
State during the trial and testified concerning the .. alleged 
re-enactment as follows: (R. 328, 329; A.F 3). 
Q. AU right, then what happened? 
A. Jf r. Fisher stopped the car and that was on the 
south side of the culve.rt that crosses the H oytsville irr'i-
ga.tion canol there where the road _passes o.ver; ~and I 
remember the Sheriff of Morgwn County (R. 329) asked 
Jfr. Mares if he would get out and Mr. Mares hesitated 
at that point and the Sheriff asked· him kindly to get out 
and told him: 'SOMETIME YOU WILL HAVE TO 
MEET THIS ANYHOW'; and that Mr. Mares got ·~ut 
with the Sheriff ·of Morgan County.'' 
WHARTON'S CRI~IINAL EVIDENCE, Vol. 2, 
11th Ed. par. 636, reads as follows: ''The admissibility 
of a confession is determined, not by the.person·to whom 
it is made, but rather, by the manner and circumstances 
under which it is p1rocur'ed. Hence, a confession is not 
ipso facto involuntary and therefore inadmissible if 
made to a person in authority. But the trustworthiness 
of a confession depends upon the nature of the: induce-
. ment held out, and the strength of this inducen1ent de-
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the class of p·ersons to whom the confession is made is 
often an important consideration. It is recognized that 
the actual state of relationship between the accused and 
the person in apparent authority must always be in-
quired into with reference to the probable strength of 
the inducement. The rule is equally well settled that 
even a slight inducement held out by such a p·erson ren-
de·rs the ·confession involuntary because the accused 
would have reason to believe that such p·erson is not only 
credible, but is in a position to carry the inducement 
into effect. ' ' 
The above quoted statement, made by the Sheriff 
of Morgan County, to the accused, certainly lends itself 
to the ·construction that here an official of the law, with 
apparent authority, is telling this young boy, who has 
been stripped of every safeguard provided by the con-
stitution and the law, ''this is w·hat you have to d:o, I 
know, for I am am official of the law.'' Confessions and 
testimony received under such circumstances are not to 
be relied upon and are not admissible evidence. The 
United States Supreme Court in ASHCRAFT v. TENN., 
322 U.S. 143, 154 stated: "We think a situation such as 
that here shown by u~controverted evidence is so in-
herently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable 
with the possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect 
against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear." 
How could a more inherently coercive situation be found 
than in the case of the plaintiff-a minor, 18 years old, 
held incommunicado without relatives, friends, guardian 
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or counsel, denied the ri_ght to a protnpt preliminary 
hearing, questioned incessantly by police, sheriffs, county 
attorneys, and special agents of the F.B.I., taken on 
excursions to perforn1 a re-enactment of the-alleged crime 
without any legal authority from court or magistrate, 
never advised of his right to counsel during such ques-
tioning. Counsel for defendant undoubtedly stresses the 
fact that plaintiff did not ask for counsel and did not 
want his mother and father to know about his incarcera-
tion. ~Ir. P. H. Neeley, county attorney for Summit 
County testified as follows: 
~ ·I said; 'Wait a minute, my boy. L.et me get your 
parents. Let me get your father and your mother and a 
lawyer, a friend. Haven't you somebody~' I said: 'Don't 
tell that to me, because I will use it against you;' and -
he said: 'No' he did not want anybody to know every-
thing about it. He did not want a lawyer. He did not 
want his father or mother; and after that he at times 
said he did not want them to know a thing about it. 
''As I remem?er, on the 22nd of August, against hf,s 
will, I wrote to his father and told him the predicam·ent 
. ! . ' -
his son was in." (R. 372, 373). 
It was -only natural that a young boy held on such 
a charge would not want anybody and especially his 
father and mother to know about· it. Mr. Neeley very 
graciously ( ~) wrote to p·laintiff's father, "against his 
will,'' on the 22nd of August, 1946, six days after. the 
plaintiff had been incarcerated and during which. time 
plaintiff had been denied every constitutional and -legal 
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right set up for his protection. The diligent endeavors 
of the police, detectives, county attorneys and special 
agents to protect society from the evils of crime when 
measured by constitutional requirements ''smack'' of the 
inquisition and not Anglo-American criminal justice. 
In connection with the testimony given by P. H. 
Neeley, County Attorney, the following should ,be noted: 
(AF6) 
There were 3'9 members of the panel of prospective 
jurors; 4 were excused for cause as active clients of P. 
H. Neeley; 3 were excused for cause for reason of fixed 
opinions. Of the remaining 32, 26 personally know P. H. 
Neeley and 20 of the 26 were former clients of P. H. 
Neeley. Of the 12 jurors who were chosen to try the case, 
10 were the personal friends of P. H. Neeley and 7 of 
the 10 were former clients of P. H. Neeley. The foreman 
of the jury was the Bishop of the Church where P. H. 
Neeley was a High Priest in the ecclesiastical stake, 
which included the esscesiastical ward presided over by 
said foreman as the Bishop thereof. That plaintiff's 
counsel knew prior to the time that the jury was sworn 
that the individual who subsequently became foreman 
of the jury was a Bishop in said Church and that P. H. 
Neeley was the County Attorney and an active church 
man, but neither plaintiff nor his counsel knew at that 
time that the State was going to use said County Attor-
ney as its major witness at the trial, the said County 
Atto·rney's name not having been endorsed on the infor-
mation as a witness in accordance with the Statute and 
p·ractice in said State. 
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PROPOSITION IV. IT IS A VIOLATION OF THE D,UE 
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 
7 ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND 
SECTION 105-13-17 UTAH CODE ANN·OTATED, 1943, TO 
ADMIT IN EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED 
CONFESSIONS AND STATEMENTS ELICITED_ FROM THE 
ACCUSED DURING ILLEGAL DETENTION DUE TO FAlL-
URE PROMPTLY TO CARRY A PRISONER BEFORE A 
COMMITTING MAGISTRATE. 
Section 105-13-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, pro-
vides: 
''When om, arrest is made without ·a w·arrant by a· 
peace o jficer or private person, the pers·on -ar.rest.ed 'YYIJUSt, 
without ulrmecessary deZay, be taken to the nearest or 
most accessible magistrate in the co'l11nty in which the 
arrest is made, and a complaint, stat.ing the charge 
against the person mJUSt be made befo·re such magistrate. 
" 
The plaintiff was arrested on the evening of August 
16, 1946, at about 8:30P.M. and booked for investigation. 
(AF 2). It was not until the 21st of Au_gust, 1946, that 
a criminal complaint was lodged against the plaintiff, 
wherein he was charged with murder, and brought: before 
the committing magistrate William. H. Chappell, Justice 
of the Peace at Coalville, Utah. (AF 4). During this 
period of tin1e the plaintiff was held incommunicado, 
without the advice of friends, relatives, guardian or 
counsel. He was not advised of his right to counseL. He 
\vas questioned by the police, county attorneys, sheriffs 
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.and sp~ecial agents of the F.B.I. On the 18th of August, 
1946, after ap!proximately five hours of questioning, an 
alleged confession was dictated hy these two special 
agents to the Chief of Police's stenographer and approx-
imately three hours later the plaintiff signed it. ( R. 414; 
AF 2). On the 19th of August, 1946, plaintiff was taken 
by P. H. Neeley, County Attorney, and other officers 
back over the route of the alleged crime. This was done 
without an order from a court or magistrate authorizing 
such a procedure. (AF 3). 
The practice followed by these police officials and 
the county attorney is directly in violation of the plain 
reading of Se-ction 105-13-17, quoted above. To arrest 
I , 
and hold a person on mere suspicion in order to exact 
from him in any way possible confessions and testimony 
is a violation of the law and the confessions and testi-
mony secured by said procedure is inadmissible a.s evi-
dence at the trial of the accused. Despite objection by 
counsel the trial court admitted confessions and state-
ments secured from the plaintiff during this period of 
time, which evidence was a substantial factor in his con-
viction. ( AF 5). ·The p~raotice used to extract confes--
sions and statements from 'P'la.intiff should he condemned 
by- this court, and it becomes even more repugnant to 
the established procedure of criminal justice and the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah when we note 
that the police and county attorney were not dealing with 
a hardened criminal with a knowledge of criminal pro-
·cedures, but rather with an eighteen-year-old boy who 
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\Ya~ eon1pletely ignorant of his constitutional and legal 
rights. 
The United States Supreme Court has condemned 
such practices in eri1nes tried before the federal courts 
as in violation of Rule 3(a) Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. which provides: 
'~ .... \..n officer making an arrest under a warrant issued 
upon a coinplaint. or any person making an arrest without 
a warrant shall take the arrested p-erson without unnec-
essary delay before the nearest available commi~sioner 
or before any other nearby officer empowered to com-
mit persons charged with offenses against the United 
States. When a person arrested without a warrant is 
brought before a commissioner or other officer, a com-
plaint shall be filed forthwith.'' 
It should be noted that the Federal rule requires 
that exactly the same procedure be followed as does the 
Utah provision. In the case of UPSHAW v. UNI1TED 
STArES, 335 U.S. 410, 413, 414, 69 lS,. Ct. 170, 172 
(1948) the Supreme Court held that a confession was 
inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to fail-
ure to p~romptly carry a prisoner before a committing 
magistrate as provided by Rule 5 (a) quoted above. The 
court stated at page 413: "The Mitchell case, 332 U.S. 
at page 68, 64 S. Ct. at page 8~8, however, re-affirms 
the 1f.cNahb rule that a confession is inadmissible if 
rnade during illegal detention due to failure promptly 
to carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, 
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whether or not the 'oonfession is the result of tortu;re, 
physical or psychalogic:a.l' ... '' 
Page 14: "In this case we are left in no doubt as 
to why this petitioner was not brought promptly before 
a ~ommitting magistrate. The arresting officer himself 
stated that p·etitioner was not ·carried before a magistrate 
on Friday or Saturday morning after his arrest on 
Friday at 2 :00 A.M., because the officer thought there 
was 'not sufficient case' for the court to hold him, add-
ing that even 'if the police court did hold him we would 
lose custody of him and I no longer would be able to 
question him.' Thus the arresting officer in effect con-
ceded that the confessions here were 'the fruits of 
wrongdoing' by the police officer. He conceded more: 
He admitted that petitioner was illegally detained for at 
least thirty hours for the very purpose of securing these 
challenged confessions. He thereby refutes any possi-
bility of an argument that after arrest he was carried 
before a magistrate 'without unnecessary delay.' " 
Plaintiff contends that the delay of five days before 
taking him before a committing magistrate was unrea-
sonable and in violation of the law, and certainly the 
only assumption that can be made from all the attendant 
circumstances is that; ''plaintiff was not taken before 
a magistrate until the police, county attorneys, etc. 
could force statements and confessions from plaintiff 
sufficient to convict him of the crime of 1nurder in the 
·first degree.'' '· Any other conclusion would not be in 
accordance with the undisputed facts. 
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The Utah la'v specifically required that plaintiff be 
taken 'vithout unnecessary delay before the nearest mag-
istrate and a con1plaint tiled. In violating this right, 
the plaintiff "?as denied due process of law as require·d 
by the 14th Alnendrnent of the Constitution of the United 
States and Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. The very essence of due process required 
that appropriate procedure be followed before liberty 
is curtailed or life is taken. The United States ·S,upreme 
Court in ''T ATTS v. STATE OF INDIANA, 338 U.S. 
49, 69 S. Ct. 1347 (1949) stated at page 55: "In holding 
that the Due Process Clause bars police procedure which 
violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of 
prosecuting crime and vitiates a conviction based on the 
fruits of such 'procedure, we apply the Due Process 
Clause to its historic function of assuring appropriate 
procedure before liberty is curtailed or life is taken." 
Further argument pertinent to the constitutional 
questions raised in the proposition have been sufficiently 
set out in the first thre~ propositions and reference is 
made thereto. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion plaintiff states that the Due Pr~ocess 
Clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States and Section 7 of Article I of the Con-
stitution of Utah and Section 105-13-17, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, are all violated when the police take into 
custody an 18 year old minor accused of murder, hold 
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him for 12 days without a preliminary hearing, during 
said period of time question him intensely at various 
times, and for five hours straight prior to obtaining a 
purported confession from him; stage a purported re-
enactment of the crime without a court order three days 
after the accused had been arrested and while he was 
still being held by police and detection officials without 
the assistance of counsel, relatives, guardians or friends; 
fail to furnish said minor who was accused of a eapital 
offense the aid of ·counsel, or to inform him of his right 
to counsel during his incarceration from the time he was 
arrested until the preliminary hearing; and fail to take 
said minor, without unnecessary delay to the nearest or 
most accessible magistrate in the court in which the 
arrest was made, and a complaint stating the charge 
against said minor be made before such magistrate. 
Plaintiff submits that all the evidence obtained under 
these circumstances was inadmissible at the trial of said · 
minor for murder. Despite objection thereto, the. court 
allowed such evidence to ·be admitted, thereby violating 
plaintiff's ·constitutional rights as hereinabove set forth. 
Therefore, the judgment of the court convicting plaintiff 
of murder in the first degree should be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & McCUI_JLOUGH 
Att~orneys for Plaintiff , 
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